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Abstract
This paper investigates the welfare e®ects of international transfers of environmental tech-
nologies in open economies with international oligopoly and transboundary pollution, and
shows that policy di®erentiation between the donor and recipient countries and/or prod-
uct di®erentiation between the donor and recipient ¯rms play a critical role in obtaining a
bilateral agreement on the transfer policy between nations. The results arise from the fact
that policy di®erentiation weakens the strategic relationships in environmental policy setting
between governments and that product di®erentiation weakens the strategic relationships in
quantity choices between ¯rms.
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JEL Classi¯cation: F18; H23
1 Introduction
The relationship between environmental policies and trade liberalizations has been receiving
increasing practical and academic attention. Some economists indicate that the trade global-
ization may provide countries with an incentive to relax their environmental policies for fear
of disadvantaging domestic industries.1 This tendency of the `race to the bottom' in an envi-
ronmental policy setting makes it di±cult for countries to multilaterally cooperate in tackling
global environmental problems.
Recently, the transfer of superior environmental technologies to less-advanced countries has
been considered an e®ective policy in confronting international environmental problems such as
global warming. The reason for this is that the transfer of clean technologies may improve the
environment and welfare not only in the recipient country but also that in the donor country
¤Address: Department of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8, Osumi, Higashiyodogawa-ku,
Osaka, 533-8533, JAPAN
1For a detailed discussion, see Barrett (1994), Willson (1996), Rauscher (1997), and Ulph (1999) among several
others.
1
through the decreases in transboundary pollution. In fact, for instance, the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) in Kyoto Protocol encourages the Annex I Parties (developed countries) to
transfer their low carbon technologies to non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) in order to
obtain credits for greenhouse gasses. Another example is that Japan has increased the amount
of bilateral technical cooperation in its environmental O±cial Development Assistance (ODA).2
Can international transfers of environmental technologies actually lead to Pareto-improving
outcomes? Various studies have been conducted on this issue through the application of the
model of private provision of public goods. This type of literature considers the global environ-
ment as a public good to which each government voluntarily contributes by reducing emissions.3
Buchholz and Konrad (1994) and Ihori (1996) have shown that countries might have an in-
ventive to adopt ine±cient environmental technologies even if more e±cient technologies were
available at no charge. This seemingly paradoxical result arises from the strategic relationship
between governments: The adoption of superior emission technologies by one country induces
other countries to free ride and increases their emissions (i.e. decreases their contributions). In
the context of environmental technology transfers, the result implies that the transfer policy
may not be Pareto-improving, since the transfer might reduce the welfare of the recipient coun-
try. Subsequently, constructing a model where a technologically advanced country can decide
the amount of technology transfers to the less-advanced country prior to the contribution stage,
Stranlund (1997) indicated that technology transfer might be Pareto-improving. Likewise, Lee
(2001) pointed out that technology transfer may reduce the welfare of the recipient country
in the case of the global environment being a pure public good, whereas it may be Pareto-
improving if the global environment is an impure public good. Recently, Hattori (2005) showed
that technology transfer would be bene¯cial for both countries if the private and public goods
(the environment) are complementary for consumers.
However, these studies have not considered the manner in which each government contributes
to public goods (the manner of controlling the emissions) since they have concentrated on the
strategic interactions between the governments. In addition, they have not captured the strategic
behavior of ¯rms or the interactions of international markets despite the fact that the govern-
mental policy for reducing emissions necessarily a®ects the behavior of ¯rms. Considering the
strategic interactions of the international market may a®ect the welfare result of international
transfer of environmental technologies.
In order to address these questions, we construct a three-stage game with international trade
and transboundary pollution and investigate the welfare e®ects of the international transfers of
environmental technologies.4 The model developed here consists of two countries, each having
2According to Japan's O±cial Development Assistance Annual Report 2006, the number of trainees accepted
from the developing countries has increased from 1,192 in 1994 to 2,162 in 2005, and the number of projects
related to environmental technology cooperation to the developing countries has also increased from 47 in 2000
to 169 in 2005.
3For more detailed investigations, extensions, and applications of the private provision of public goods, see
Cornes and Sandler (1996). Further, for an early research on the application of strategic environmental relations
between governments, see Hoel (1990).
4By constructing an open-economy model with international competition and environmental externality, Bar-
rett (1994), Kennedy (1995), Rauscher (1997), and Ulph (1999) conducted analyses on strategic environmental
policies in various international contexts. However, these studies failed to analyze the welfare e®ects of envi-
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one representative ¯rm. In the ¯rst stage (diplomatic policy stage), the government decides
whether or not to o®er the transfer of environmental technologies to the foreign government. If
they do, then the foreign government decides whether or not to accept the o®er. In the second
stage (domestic policy stage), each government simultaneously sets domestic environmental
(emission) taxes. In the third stage (Cournot competition stage), each ¯rm competes in the
world market in Cournot fashion, given the policies in both the countries. The pollution arises
from production and could be transboundary. Such model structures enable us to investigate
the welfare e®ects of technology transfer not only through intergovernmental policy relationships
but also through the market interactions between ¯rms.
Within this framework, we ¯rst investigate the welfare e®ects of the transfer in the case of
both ¯rms selling homogenous products as a benchmark case. Further, the model is extended
by incorporating two types of di®erentiations: policy and product di®erentiations. In order to
directly investigate the e®ect of policy di®erentiation on the results of the technology transfer,
we consider the case in which the emission subsidy as a policy tool is prohibited and one country
levies the emission taxes on a domestic ¯rm whereas the other country does not. Subsequently,
we consider the case where ¯rms produce di®erentiated goods in the world market.
The results of the analysis reveal that the policy and product di®erentiations play important
roles in ensuring that the transfer policy leads to Pareto-improvement. In contrast, if there
are only a few di®erences in the qualities produced or the policies implemented between the
donor and the recipient, the bilateral agreement on the transfer will not be established. The
results are based on the following reasons. Technology transfer not only induces the recipient
government to relax its domestic environmental policies but also induces the recipient ¯rm to
increase the outputs, which provides the donor government negative incentives for transfer due to
the strategic relationships in policy and production choices. However, the policy di®erentiation
weakens the strategic relationships in the policy setting between the countries, and moreover,
the product di®erentiation weakens the strategic relationships in quantity setting between the
¯rms. In other words, the two di®erentiations reduce the negative transfer incentives for the
donor, and hence, may encourage technology transfers.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. In the next section, we
construct the basic model in which both the representative ¯rms produce homogenous goods,
and we investigate the welfare implications of transferring the environmental technologies. In
order to clearly demonstrate the importance of policy asymmetry between countries with respect
to the results, Section 3 considers the case of policy asymmetry where the implementation of
emission subsidies is prohibited. In Section 4, the product di®erentiation is considered as well.
In the last section, we conclude the paper and provide directions for future work.
2 The Benchmark Model
Consider two ¯rms, 1 and 2, that produce homogenous products and are located in two di®erent
countries, 1 and 2, respectively. Each ¯rm i 2 f1; 2g engages in Cournot (quantity) competition
ronmental technology transfer among nations. See Requate (2006) for further details regarding environmental
policies under imperfect competition.
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in a world market. Production of goods requires domestic labor li using linear technology qi = li,
where qi is the output of ¯rm i. In the production process, ¯rms generate pollution which is
proportional to their output, that is, ¯rm i's emissions are given by ±iqi, where ±i is the emission
coe±cient of ¯rm i. Pro¯ts of ¯rm i are de¯ned as:
¦i = P (Q) qi ¡ wi li ¡ ±i qi ti; 8 i 2 f1; 2g; (1)
where P (Q) is the inverse demand in the world market (Q =
P
i qi), wi is the wage rate of
country i, and ti is the rate of emission tax imposed in country i.
In order to alleviate the environmental damages from emissions, each government i can impose
an emission tax (or subsidy) ti on the domestic ¯rm. However, each country su®ers not only
from the domestic ¯rm's emissions but also from the foreign ¯rm's emissions since the emissions
possess a transboundary property. Thus, the total emissions in country i, Ei, are given by:
Ei = ±iqi + °±jqj ; 8 i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j; (2)
where ° 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of transboundary pollution. Perfectly domestic (global)
pollution is characterized by ° = 0 (° = 1).5
Welfare of country i is de¯ned as the sum of ¯rm i's pro¯t, the tax revenue, and the disutility
from emissions in country i:
Wi = ¦i +Ri ¡Di(Ei); 8 i 2 f1; 2g; (3)
where Ri = ±iqiti is the tax revenue of government i, and Di(¢) is the environmental damage
cost (D is assumed to be increasing and convex with D(0) = 0).
We consider the following three-stage game: In stage 1, as a diplomatic policy, the government
in the country where the ¯rm with a relatively superior environmental technology is located
decides whether or not to o®er the transfer of the environmental technologies to a foreign ¯rm.
If they do, the foreign government decides whether or not to accept the o®er. In stage 2,
each government simultaneously decides its domestic environmental policy, namely, setting an
environmental tax rate. In stage 3, each ¯rm chooses the output, given the environmental
technologies and taxes.
2.1 Stage 3: Cournot competition
The model is solved backwards. Pro¯t maximization of ¯rm i yields the ¯rst-order condition:
P + P 0qi ¡ wi ¡ ±iti = 0; 8 i 2 f1; 2g; (4)
which determines the equilibrium output of ¯rm i as qi(¢) = qi(ti; tj ; ±i; ±j ;wi; wj); 8 i; j 2
f1; 2g; i 6= j:
Lemma 1
The equilibrium output in the third stage has the following properties:
@qi
@ti
< 0;
@qi
@tj
> 0;
@qi
@±i
< 0;
@qi
@±j
> 0;
@qi
@wi
< 0;
@qi
@wj
> 0; 8 i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j:
5In other words, emissions are pure private bads for countries if ° = 0 and are pure public bads if ° = 1.
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Proof: See Appendix.
The third-stage equilibrium outputs, which have the standard property of a Cournot oligopoly
setting, are decreasing in the own taxes, emission coe±cients, and wages and increasing in those
of the rival.
Substituting the equilibrium output into the pro¯t function yields the equilibrium pro¯t in
the third stage represented by ¦i(¢) = ¦i(qi(¢); qj(¢); ti; ±i).
2.2 Stage 2: Domestic policy choices in environmental taxes
In stage 2, each government sets the emission taxes so as to maximize its national welfare. By
using the envelope theorem, the ¯rst-order conditions of welfare maximization are obtained as
below:
@¦i
@qj
@qj
@ti
¡ ±iqi| {z }
(¡)
+
@Ri
@ti
+
@Ri
@qi
@qi
@ti| {z }
(+) or (¡)
¡D0(¢)
"
@Ei
@qi
@qi
@ti
+
@Ei
@qj
@qj
@ti
#
| {z }
(+)
= 0: 8i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j: (5)
The ¯rst under-braced term in (5) captures the pro¯t-shifting e®ects of environmental taxes,
which consist of two parts: strategic and cost-raising e®ects. The former refers to the e®ect
brought about by imperfect competition, and the latter is the direct e®ect of taxes on the
marginal cost of production. Since both of these e®ects are negative, each government has an
incentive to reduce taxes in order to gain pro¯ts.
The second under-braced term in (5) captures the revenue-raising e®ects of environmental
taxes, which also consist of two parts: direct and indirect e®ects. The former is positive, while
the latter is negative; this is because the increases in taxes shrink the domestic production.
After all, the revenue-raising e®ects are positive (negative) if the tax elasticity of the output is
less (more) than unity.6
The third under-braced term in (5) captures the pollution-reducing e®ects of environmental
taxes. The square bracket following the marginal damage D0 represents the variation of emis-
sions through the changes in their own tax rate. The ¯rst term in the square bracket represents
decreases in emissions by shrinking its ¯rm's output, and the second term represents an in-
crease in emission by increasing the other ¯rm's output. In the case of the absence of emission
spillovers (° = 0), the second term reduces to zero. In this case, the pollution-reducing e®ects
are necessarily positive. The larger the value of °, the greater the emission spillovers as a re-
sult of the increase in other ¯rm's output. We con¯rm that in the case of linear demand, the
pollution-reducing e®ects become positive for 0:5±j < ±i < 2±j 8 i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j. Throughout
the paper, we assume the following:
Assumption 1 0:5±j < ±i < 2±j 8 i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j.
The assumption indicates that the emission e±ciencies are not extremely di®erentiated be-
tween ¯rms to the extent that the pollution-reduction e®ects become negative.
6Using the tax elasticity of output ²iit ´ ¡ @qi@ti =
qi
ti
, the revenue-raising e®ects can be rewriten as ±iqi(1¡ ²iit ).
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As a result, each government sets a positive environmental tax rate when the positive
pollution-reducing e®ects dominate a sum of the negative pro¯t-shifting e®ects and positive/negative
revenue-raising e®ects.
To make the analysis simple, we further assume that both the inverse demand function and
the environmental damage function are linear.
Assumption 2 P 00 = D00 = 0.
Thereupon, equation (5) reduces to
P 0 ¢ qi(¢)¡ 2±iti + (2±i ¡ °±j)D0i = 0; 8 i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j: (6)
which de¯nes the reaction function of government i. Solving equations (6) yields the second-stage
equilibrium tax rate expressed as ti(¢) = ti(±i; ±j ;wi; wj ; °).
Lemma 2
(i) The policy choices of each government exhibit the properties of a strategic substitute. In
addition, the unique Nash equilibrium in the stage is stable.
(ii) The equilibrium tax rate in each country is smaller than the domestic marginal environ-
mental damage (i.e., ti < D
0
i 8 i).
(iii) The equilibrium tax rate has the following properties:
@ti
@±i
> 0;
@ti
@±j
< 0;
@ti
@wi
> 0;
@ti
@wj
< 0;
@ti
@°
< 0; 8 i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j:
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 2 (ii) implies that each country strategically sets smaller tax rates than the domestic
Pigouvian rate. This is due to the following two factors: ecological-dumping7 and free-riding.
The former represents government incentives to relax the domestic environmental taxes for the
purpose of shifting pro¯ts from the foreign to the domestic ¯rm, and the latter represents them
for the purpose of free-riding on foreign country's e®orts to reduce the transboundary pollution.
From Lemma 2 (iii), we can see that the equilibrium tax rate is decreasing in own emission
e±ciency and increasing in rival's. In other words, the improvement of their own environmental
technology lowers their own tax and raises the rival's tax. In addition, the tax rates are higher
in the country with high wages than in that with low wages. Finally, the equilibrium tax rates
in both countries become small if the degree of transboundary pollution is high because a large
° makes the environment more purely public goods (bads) and enlarges the above free-riding
factor.
As a result, we obtain the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in stages 2 and 3 described as
follows:8
ti(¢) = ti(±i; ±j ; °); qi(¢) = qi(ti(¢); tj(¢); ±i; ±j);
7The term `ecological-dumping' characterizes situations in which a country uses a too-lax environmental leg-
islation as an instrument of achieving trade-related economic policy goals (Rauscher, 1994).
8Obvioully, the equilibrium level of each variable depends on wi and wj , but we omit them in the dependent
variable because we do not investigate the e®ects of the changes in wi.
6
¦i(¢) = ¦i(qi(¢); qj(¢); ti(¢); ±i); Ri(¢) = Ri(qi(¢); ti(¢); ±i);
Di(¢) = Di(qi(¢); qj(¢); ±i; ±j ; °); Wi = ¦i(¢) +Ri(¢)¡Di(¢):
2.3 Stage 1: Diplomatic negotiations for environmental transfer
Subsequently, we explore the conditions for bilateral agreement on environmental technology
transfer between governments. Without loss of generality, we assume that the technology transfer
proposal is made by country 1 to 2 (hereafter we call country 1 (2) as a donor (a recipient)).
Technology transfer is de¯ned as a marginal improvement of the emission technology of ¯rm 2,
i.e. a marginal decrease in ±2, and is assumed to be unconditional and costless.
It is certain that the agreement cannot be obtained between the recipient and the donor
unless the welfare of both countries is enhanced by the transfers. We investigate the conditions
under which the agreement can be voluntarily achieved.
The e®ects of the marginal improvement of the recipient ¯rm on the welfare of each country
are
Donor : ¡ @W1
@±2
=
µ
@D1
@q2
¡ @¦1
@q2
¶µ
@q2
@±2
+
@q2
@t2
@t2
@±2
¶
| {z }
(¡)
+
µ
@D1
@q1
¡ @R1
@q1
¶µ
@q1
@±2
+
@q1
@t2
@t2
@±2
¶
| {z }
(+)
+
@D1
@±2|{z}
(+)
; (7)
Recipient : ¡ @W2
@±2
=
µ
@D2
@q1
¡ @¦2
@q1
¶µ
@q1
@±2
+
@q1
@t1
@t1
@±2
¶
| {z }
(+)
+
µ
@D2
@q2
¡ @R2
@q2
¶µ
@q2
@±2
+
@q2
@t1
@t1
@±2
¶
| {z }
(¡)
+
@D2
@±2|{z}
(+)
: (8)
Equation (7) represents the e®ect of the transfer policy on the donor's welfare, which can be
considered as transfer incentives for the donor. This can be decomposed into three components.
The ¯rst under-braced term in (7) represents the negative e®ect on the donor's welfare through
the increases in transboundary pollution and the decreases in the pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm,
which are induced by the increases in the output of the recipient ¯rm. This is because the
decreases in ±2 boost the output of the recipient ¯rm by lowering the recipient's tax rate and its
emissions.
The second under-braced term in (7) represents the e®ect on the donor's welfare through the
decreases in pollution and tax revenues, which are induced by the decreases in the output of
the donor ¯rm. The decreases in ±2 shrink the output of the donor ¯rm by raising the donor's
tax rate and lowering the strategic position of the donor ¯rm against the recipient ¯rm. Since
(@D1@q1 ¡ @R1@q1 ) = ±1(D01 ¡ t1) > 0 holds in equilibrium (from Lemma 2), the term is positive. The
last under-braced term represents the direct e®ect of the marginal decrease in ±2 on emission
spillovers.
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Equation (8) represents the e®ect of the transfer policy on the recipient's welfare, which can
be considered as adoption incentives for the recipient. This can also be decomposed into three
components. The ¯rst under-braced term in (8) represents the positive e®ect on the recipient's
welfare through the decreases in the rival's production, the second under-braced term represents
the negative e®ect through the increases in domestic production, and the third under-braced
term represents the direct positive e®ect.
In order to clearly identify the qualitative properties of two types of incentives, we calculate
the explicit forms of equations (7) and (8) by substituting the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 into
them. Thus we have
Donor : ¡ @W1
@±2
=
(±2°D01 ¡ P 0q1)(8D02 + °D01)
10P 0
+ °D01q2 ? 0; (9)
Recipient : ¡ @W2
@±2
= ¡°±1(2°D
0
1 +D
0
2)D
0
2
5P 0
+
2(°D01 + 3D02)
5
q2 > 0: (10)
From equation (10), we ¯nd that the adoption incentives are always positive. However,
the sign of the transfer incentives for the donor (9) is ambiguous since the ¯rst term in (9)
is negative while the second term is positive. If ° = 0, the second-tem is equal to zero and
the equation would reduce to ¡4D02q1=5 < 0, which implies that the transfer incentives are
necessarily negative for purely domestic pollution. In contrast, if ° = 1, (9) would reduce to
¡@W1
@±2
¯¯¯¯
¯
°=1
= ¡ 1
5P 0
·
5D01
³
2±2(D02 ¡ t2)¡ ±1D02
´
¡ ±1(D01 + 8D02)(D01 ¡ t1)
¸
: (11)
In a symmetric equilibrium (D0i = D
0, ti = t, ±i = ± 8i 2 f1; 2g), the above reduces to ±D
0(4D0+t)
5P 0 ,
which implies that the transfer incentives for the donor are also negative unless t > ¡4D0.
However, in the case where t2 is su±ciently low relative to t1, the incentives would be positive.
Table 1 presents the simulation results in which we specify the inverse demand as P (Q) =
A ¡ q1 ¡ q2. In Case (A), we choose the parameters that lead to t1 > 0 and t2 < 0. In such a
case with large policy di®erentiation, the transfer enhances both countries' welfare for w2 < 1:2.
In Case (B), we choose the parameters that lead to ti > 0; 8i. Further, in this case, the transfer
bene¯ts both when w2 = 1. From the table, we can con¯rm that the technology transfer is
Pareto-improving if there are strong asymmetries of the wage, the marginal damage, and the
tax rate between the countries. Thus, we have the following proposition:
###### Table 1 goes here. ######
Proposition 1
A bilateral agreement with respect to the environmental technology transfer cannot be reached
between countries that implement similar environmental tax policies except when there is a
strong asymmetry between them.
The reason behind the disagreement on the transfer is that the improvement in the recipient
¯rm's emission coe±cients of the recipient ¯rm has two negative e®ects on the donor's welfare:
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one is the decreases in the recipient's tax rate and the other is the decreases in the marginal
production cost of the rival ¯rm. The former e®ect induces the donor to raise the tax rate
because policy settings are strategic substitutes, and the latter e®ect leads the donor ¯rm to
reduce its output because quantity settings are strategic substitutes as well.9
In the next section, in order to clearly demonstrate the importance of the di®erence in the
environmental policies implemented by countries with respect to the welfare results of technology
transfers, we will consider a distinctive case in which one country does not levy tax on the
domestic ¯rm but another does under non-negative constraint on emission tax rates.
3 Policy Di®erentiation Considered
In the previous section, we assumed that countries can set a negative rate of emission taxes,
that is, emission subsidies. In this section, we exclude the possibilities that countries set a
negative environmental tax rate, due to, for example, the constraints of the WTO agreements.
We consider the case where one country (country N) levies positive environmental tax but the
other (country S) does not, i.e. tN > 0 and tS = 0 hold in the second stage equilibrium. This
modi¯cation enables us to clearly show the importance of policy di®erentiation in the technology
transfer policies.
From Lemma 2, tN > 0 and tS = 0 may hold in the second stage equilibrium when wS
or D0S is su±ciently low. In other words, if a particular county has a much smaller wage or
environmental awareness than the other, then it sets a zero tax rate. This is the reason we call
it as a southern country (country S).
The equilibrium in stage 3 is the same as before. In stage 2, tN > 0 and tS = 0 are obtained
when the following (¯rst-order) conditions hold:
Country N : P 0qN ¡ 2±N tN + (2±N ¡ °±S)D0N = 0; (12)
Country S : P 0qS ¡ 2±StS + (2±S ¡ °±N )D0S < 0:
From tS = 0, there is no strategic relationship in setting environmental taxes, and the equilibrium
value of tN is obtained by tN (±N ; ±S) from (12).
Lemma 3
The equilibrium tax rate of country N in the second stage has the following properties:
@tN
@±N
=
3D0N ¡ 2tN
2±N
> 0;
@tN
@±S
= ¡3°D
0
N
4±N
< 0;
@tN
@°
= ¡3±SD
0
N
4±N
< 0:
9Alternatively, consider the case where technology transfers can be implemented between ¯rms (not govern-
ments) in stage 1. In this situation, the agreement is never reached for free since it holds that
¡@¦i
@±j
= ¡@¦i
@qj
@qj
@±j| {z }
(¡)
¡@¦i
@qj
 
@qj
@ti
@ti
@±j
+
@qj
@tj
@tj
@±j
!
¡ @¦i
@ti
@ti
@±j| {z }
(¡)
< 0:
9
Proof: See Appendix.
As a result, we obtain the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in stages 2 and 3, which is
described as follows:
tN = tN (±N ; ±S ; °); tS = 0; qN = qN (tN (¢); ±N ); qS = qS(tN (¢); ±N );
¦N = ¦N (qN (¢); qS(¢); tN (¢); ±N ); ¦S = ¦S(qN (¢); qS(¢))
WN = ¦N (¢) +RN (qN (¢); tN (¢); ±N )¡DN (qN (¢); qS(¢); ±N ; ±S ; °);
WS = ¦S(¢)¡DS(qN (¢); qS(¢); ±N ; ±S ; °):
Subsequently, we investigate the welfare e®ects of the environmental technology transfer from
countriesN to S. The e®ects of the marginal decrease (improvement) in ±S (emission technology)
on welfare of the donor and recipient countries are obtained as follows:
Donor : ¡ @WN
@±S
=
@DN
@±S
= °D0NqS > 0; (13)
Recipient : ¡ @WS
@±S
=
µ
@DS
@qN
¡ @¦S
@qN
¶µ
@qN
@tN
@tN
@±S
¶
| {z }
(+)
+
@DS
@qS
µ
@qS
@tN
@tN
@±S
¶
| {z }
(¡)
+
@DS
@±S| {z }
(+)
= ¡°(2°±N ¡ ±S)D
0
N ¡ 4P 0qS
4P 0
D0S +
°D0N
2
qS > 0: (14)
From (13) and (14), we can see that the transfer incentives for the donor as well as the adoption
incentives for the recipient are necessarily positive and are increasing in °, D0N , and qS . The
intuitions are as follows. First, the recipient government cannot reduce the tax rates after adopt-
ing the transfers because of the assumption of the nonnegative constraint of the environmental
tax. Second, adopting more e±cient technologies cannot better the strategic position of the
recipient ¯rm against the donor ¯rm under market competition with tS = 0. Thus, transfer-
ring the environmental technologies would bene¯t the donor only through the decreases in the
transboundary pollution.
Proposition 2
Under the situation where emission subsidies are prohibited, the agreement of the environmental
technology transfer can be reached if the transfer is implemented from the country that sets
positive environmental taxes to the country that does not.
Notice that although technology transfer from country N to S enhances both countries'
welfare, it reduces the pro¯ts in country N . This can be con¯rmed by di®erentiating ¦N in
¡±S :
¡@¦N
@±S
= ¡
µ
@¦N
@qS
@qS
@tN
@tN
@±S
+
@¦N
@tN
@tN
@±S
¶
= ¡°D
0
N
4
qN < 0:
Thus, the policy makers in the donor country should consider an allocation of the gains from
transfer or the tax revenues to the domestic ¯rms in order to attract political support for the
transfer policy from the ¯rm industries.
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4 Product Di®erentiation Considered
In this section, we incorporate the second type of di®erentiation, the product di®erentiation,
into the basic model. We consider the homogenous case except for the product qualities of each
¯rm.
The inverse demand function of a world market is de¯ned here as Pi(qi; qj ; µ) 8 i 2 f1; 2g; i 6=
j, where µ 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of product di®erentiation. The function is assumed to
be
@Pi
@qi
´ P 0 < 0; @Pi
@qj
= µP 0;
@Pi
@µ
= P 0i qj ;
@2Pi
@q2i
=
@2Pi
@qi@qj
= 0 8i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j;
where two products are perfectly di®erentiated when µ = 0 and are perfectly substitutable
(homogenous) when µ = 1.10 Except for the di®erentiated products, the model structures are
similar to the basic model in Section 2.
First, we derive the equilibrium in the third stage. From the ¯rst-order conditions for the
pro¯t maximization of each ¯rm i 2 f1; 2g, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4
The equilibrium output in the third stage has the following properties:
@qi
@ti
=
2±i
(4¡ µ2)P 0i
< 0;
@qi
@tj
= ¡ µ±j
(4¡ µ2)P 0j
> 0;
@qi
@±i
=
2ti
(4¡ µ2)P 0i
< 0;
@qi
@±j
= ¡ µtj
(4¡ µ2)P 0j
> 0;
@qi
@µ
= ¡2qj ¡ µqi
(4¡ µ2) :
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that the values of @qi=@tj and @qi=@±j become small if µ closes to zero, which implies
that product di®erentiation weakens the market interactions between the ¯rms.
Subsequently, we solve the second-stage equilibrium. The ¯rst-order conditions for the welfare
maximization of the governments are obtained as follows:
µ2P 0iqi ¡ 2±iti + (2±i ¡ °µ±j)D0i = 0 8i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j; (15)
which is the reaction function of government i. Solving (15) yields the equilibrium tax rates in
country i described by ~ti(±i; ±j ; °; µ).
Lemma 5
~ti = D0i if µ = 0, and ~ti < D
0
i otherwise.
Proof: This can be easily shown from (15) by applying the proof of Lemma 2 (ii).
The lemma states that if the products are perfectly di®erentiated, then the equilibrium
tax rates set by each government are equal to the domestic marginal environmental damage;
10For example, the linear inverse demand function such as Pi = A ¡ b(qi + µqj) has the same properties that
we assume.
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otherwise, the equilibrium tax rates are less than the domestic marginal environmental damage.
In other words, the optimal environmental tax levied on the domestic ¯rm, which is a monopolist
in the world market, coincides with the Pigouvian tax rate, even if there are negative pollution
spillovers. The result of µ = 0 here is consistent with the results of Rauscher (1997).11
Lemma 6
In a symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium tax rate in the second stage has the following
properties:
@~ti
@±i
=
­D0 ¡ ©t
©±
> 0;
@~ti
@±j
= ¡2µ[2°(2¡ µ
2) + µ2]D0
©±
< 0;
@~ti
@°
= ¡ µ(2 + µ)D
0
4 + 2µ ¡ µ2 < 0;
@~ti
@µ
= ¡°±(2 + µ)D
0 ¡ µ(4 + µ)P 0q
±(4 + 2µ ¡ µ2) < 0;
where © = (µ2 ¡ 2µ ¡ 4)(µ2 + 2µ ¡ 4) > 0 and ­ = (16 + °µ4 ¡ 8µ2) > © > 0.
Proof See Appendix.
In the lemma, it holds that @~ti=@µ < 0, which implies that the equilibrium tax rate becomes
smaller as the products are more homogenous. As µ increases, the competition in the world
market becomes severe, and the pro¯t-shifting e®ects of environmental taxes also increase. Thus,
each government sets a lower tax rate as µ increases, which can be considered as a type of
ecological-dumping.
Each variable in the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in stages 2 and 3 is obtained as follows:
~ti(¢) = ~ti(±i; ±j ; °; µ); ~qi(¢) = ~qi(~ti(¢); ~tj(¢); ±i; ±j ; µ);e¦i(¢) = e¦i(~qi(¢); ~qj(¢); ~ti(¢); ±i); fWi = e¦i(¢) + ±i~qi(¢)~ti(¢)¡Di(±i~qi + °±j ~qj(¢))
Prior to the exploration of the welfare e®ects of technology transfers, we mention the e®ect
of product di®erentiation on the equilibrium outputs and on pollution.
Lemma 7
The equilibrium output of each ¯rm ~qi has the following properties:
@~qi
@µ
? 0 , ¡P 0 7 °±D
0
2(1¡ µ)~q :
Proof: Di®erentiating ~qi in µ and evaluating them in a symmetric equilibrium, we get
@~qi
@µ
=
@~qi
@~ti
@~ti
@µ
+
@~qi
@~tj
@~tj
@µ
+
@~qi
@µ
= ¡°±D
0 + 2(1¡ µ)P 0~q
(4 + 2µ ¡ µ2)P 0 :
11In Rauscher (1997), constructing the model of monopolistic behavior, he showed that the optimal environ-
mental policy vis-µa-vis a domestic ¯rm, which is a monopolist in the foreign market, is to use a Pigouvian emission
tax (Proposition 6.2 in Rauscher (1997)).
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###### Figure 1 goes here. ######
In the standard theory of Cournot oligopoly with product di®erentiation, the individual and
aggregate outputs decline when the products are less di®erentiated.12 In fact, in our model,
Lemma 5 indicates that @qi=@µ < 0 holds in a symmetric equilibrium if we ignore the e®ects of
µ on the tax rate set by both governments. However, since an increase in µ lowers the tax rates
(from Lemma 6), it is possible for @~qi=@µ > 0 to hold. Figure 1 illustrates the results.13 In the
region below the @~qi=@µ = 0 line, the outputs, and hence, pollution increases if each ¯rm is more
successful in di®erentiating the products from the other ¯rm's. In other words, a movement
towards product di®erentiation by ¯rms (a decrease in µ) is detrimental for the environment in
the concerned region. On the other hand, in the region above the @~qi=@µ = 0 line, a movement
towards product di®erentiation reduces the output and pollution and, hence, is desirable for the
environment.
Finally, we investigate the welfare e®ects of a technology transfer. Di®erentiating fW1 (the
welfare of the donor) and fW2 (the welfare of the recipient) in ¡±2 and evaluating them in a
symmetric equilibrium, we obtain
Donor : ¡ @
fW1
@±2
=
­(°±D0 ¡ µP 0~q)
2©P 0
D0 + °D0~q ? 0 (16)
Recipient : ¡ @
fW2
@±2
= ¡µ(2°(2¡ µ
2) + µ2)°±D02
©P 0
+
2(2¡ µ2)f4¡ (1¡ °)µ2gD0
©
~q > 0: (17)
We can see, from (16) and (17), that the adoption incentives for the recipient are necessarily
positive, while the transfer incentives for the donor are ambiguous. Clearly, the sign of (16)
would be negative if ° = 0. If µ = 0, then by using Lemma 6, equation (16) can be reduced to
¡@
fW1
@±2
¯¯¯¯
µ=0
= ¡°D
0
P 0
½
PM
²
¡ ±~t
2
¾
? 0 , ² 7 2P
M
±~t
;
where ² ´ ¡ PP 0q 2 [0;1] is the price elasticity of demand and PM is the monopoly price.
Proposition 3
When the products are perfectly di®erentiated, the technology transfers are Pareto-improving
for ² < 2P
M
±~t
. The transfers are more likely to be Pareto-improving when ° is large and µ and
D0 are small.
Since the price elasticity of a dirty good is generally small and the values of ±~t (the tax
payments per unit of output) are much smaller than PM , ² < 2P
M
±~t
is not a special case.
12See, for example, Shy (1995).
13In order to illustrate Figure 1, we specify the inverse demand as Pi = A¡ qi ¡ µqj and use the parameters of
A = 20, wi = 0, ±i = 1, D
0
i = 8, 8 i.
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Figure 2 illustrates the ¡@fWi=@±j = 0 line.14 The transfer incentives for the donor are positive
(negative) if µ and ° are in the area above (below) the line. Further, form the ¯gure, we can
con¯rm that product di®erentiation may encourage the international transfer of environmental
technologies.15
###### Figure 2 goes here. ######
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. Firstly, when ° is large, the decreases in the
emissions of the recipient ¯rm become more bene¯cial to the donor. Secondly, when µ is small,
the cost reductions of the recipient ¯rm have a smaller e®ect on the pro¯ts of the donor ¯rm.
Finally, when D0 is small, the tax rates in both countries are also small, which means that the
cost reductions of the recipient ¯rm are also small. In that case, the transfer does not undermine
the strategic position of the donor ¯rm in the market to a great extent. Consequently, a larger
° and smaller µ and D0 tend to raise the transfer incentives for the donor.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the welfare e®ects of environmental technology transfers in open
economies with international oligopoly and transboundary pollution. We have shown that when
there are very little di®erences in the qualities produced or the policies implemented between
the donor and the recipient, the transfer incentives for the donor government would be negative
since the transfer may induce the recipient not only to relax its environmental policies due
to strategic policy relationships but also to increase the outputs due to the strategic market
relationships. Such a dismal result with respect to technology transfers changed qualitatively
when we take into consideration the di®erentiation regarding the policies and product qualities.
With respect to the policy di®erences, we have considered the case in which the donor county
levies positive environmental taxes on the domestic ¯rm and the recipient country does not
under a non-negative constraint on emission tax rates. In this case, the technology transfer
would be Pareto-improving despite the existence of international oligopoly. This is because the
recipient government cannot relax its environmental policy any further; that is, the strategic
policy relationships are absent. As for the product di®erentiations, we have shown that when the
products are highly di®erentiated, technology transfer would also be Pareto-improving despite
the negative reactions by the recipient government. This is because the product di®erentiation
14The ¯gure is obtained by specifying the inverse demand as Pi = A¡ qi ¡ µq2 and the parameters as A = 20,
wi = 0, ±i = 1 and D
0
i = 8, 8 i.
15As in the previous policy di®erentiation model, the pro¯ts of the donor ¯rm here are reduced by the diplomatic
policy of the technology transfer since
¡@¦i
@±j
= ¡2µD
0q
©
h
4 + 4° ¡ °µ2
i
< 0:
Thus, the policy makers in the donor country should allocate the gains from the transfer to the domestic ¯rms in
order to gain their political support.
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reduces the strategic market relationships between ¯rms. In other words, the two asymmetries
in policies and products weaken the policy and market relationships between nations and, hence,
encourage the international transfers of environmental technologies.
It is interesting to draw a connection between our results and those of Barrett (2001). In
his seminal work, Barrett (2001) shows that the strong asymmetry among countries plays a key
role in the enlargement of a self-enforcing international environmental agreement. Although his
model structure and subject of investigation are essentially di®erent from ours, their implications
are similar with regard to the importance of asymmetry among countries for the encouragement
of environmental cooperation.
There are a few extensions of the model that may be worth exploring. One extension would
be to consider the existence of the domestic market. Given the imperfect competition by ¯rms,
policy makers would set much laxer environmental policies for fear of reducing domestic con-
sumer surplus. In this case, the welfare results of environmental technology transfer may change.
Another conceivable extension would be to consider another functional form of environmental
damages. Indeed, our results may depend on the fact that the policy choices by governments
are strategic substitutes, which comes from our assumption of the linearity of the environmental
damage function. If we assume a strongly convex damage function, then the tax choices by gov-
ernments would be strategic complements. Moreover, in this case, the results of the technology
transfer may change. These matters await future investigation.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Total di®erentiation of (4) yieldsÃ
2P 0 + qiP 00 P 0 + qiP 00
P 0 + qjP 00 2P 0 + qjP 00
!Ã
dqi
dqj
!
=
Ã
ti
0
!
d±i +
Ã
±i
0
!
dti +
Ã
1
0
!
dwi
where ¢ =
Ã
2P 0 + qiP 00 P 0 + qiP 00
P 0 + qjP 00 2P 0 + qjP 00
!
= 3(P 0)2 + QP 0P 00 > 0. From the above, we obtain
the following comparative static results, for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j.
@qi
@ti
= (2P 0 + qjP 00)±i=¢ < 0;
@qi
@tj
= ¡(P 0 + qiP 00)±j=¢ > 0;
@qi
@±i
= (2P 0 + qjP 00)ti=¢ < 0;
@qi
@±j
= ¡(P 0 + qiP 00)tj=¢ > 0;
@qi
@wi
= (2P 0 + qjP 00)=¢ < 0;
@qi
@wj
= ¡(P 0 + qiP 00)=¢ > 0:
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Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Suppose (t¤i ; t
¤
j ) is the equilibrium tax rate and t
¤
i = D
0
i + ² holds for a nonnegative ².
Then, it holds that
P 0 ¢ qi(¢)¡ 2±it¤i + (2±i ¡ °±j)D0i = P 0 ¢ qi(¢)¡ (2±i²+ °±jD0i) < 0;
since qi(¢) is nonnegative for any value of (t¤i ; t¤j ). This contradicts with (6). Thus, ² must
be negative, which means t¤i < D
0
i.
(ii) From (6), we obtain the slope of the reaction function as
dti
dtj
¯¯¯¯
¯
foc
= ¡@
2Wi=@ti@tj
@2Wi=@t2i
= ¡ ±j
4±i
< 0;
which means that the policy choices in the second stage exhibit a strategic substitute. In
addition, the stability condition of the equilibrium¯¯¯¯
¯@2Wi@t2i
¯¯¯¯
¯ >
¯¯¯¯
¯ @2Wi@ti@tj
¯¯¯¯
¯
is satis¯ed because 4±i3 >
±j
3 (the inequality sign comes from Assumption 1).
(iii) With using the results of Lemma 1, the total di®erentiation of (6) yieldsÃ
¡43±i ¡13±j
¡13±i ¡43±j
!Ã
dti
dtj
!
=
Ã
4
3 ti ¡ 2D0i
1
3 ti + °D
0
j
!
d±i +
Ã
¡23
1
3
!
dwi
where ¹¢ =
Ã
¡43±i ¡13±j
¡13±i ¡43±j
!
= 53±i±j > 0. From the above, we obtain the following
comparative static results, for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j.
@ti
@±i
= ¡5ti ¡ 8D
0
i ¡ °Dj
5±i
> 0;
@ti
@±j
= ¡2(2°D
0
i +D
0
j)
5±i
< 0;
@ti
@wi
=
3
5±i
> 0;
@ti
@wj
= ¡ 2
5±i
< 0
where @ti=@±i > 0 comes from ti < D0i of Lemma 2 (i).
Proof of Lemma 3
The total di®erentiation of (12) yields·
P 0
@qN
@tN
¡2±N
¸
dtN+
·
P 0
@qN
@±N
¡2tN+2D0N
¸
d±N+
·
P 0
@qN
@±S
¡°D0N
¸
d±S+
·
P 0
@qN
@°
¡±SD0N
¸
d° = 0:
With using Lemma 1 and tS = 0, we obtain the comparative static results as
@tN
@±N
=
3D0N ¡ 2tN
2±N
> 0;
@tN
@±S
= ¡3°D
0
N
4±N
< 0;
@tN
@°
= ¡3±SD
0
N
4±N
< 0:
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Proof of Lemma 4
The ¯rst-order conditions for pro¯t maximization of both ¯rms are
Pi + P 0i qi ¡ wi ¡ ±iti = 0 8i 2 f1; 2g:
Thus, the total di®erentiation of the above yieldsÃ
2P 0i µP
0
i
µP 0j 2P
0
j
!Ã
dqi
µP 0j
!
=
Ã
ti
0
!
d±i +
Ã
±i
0
!
dti +
Ã
P 0iqj
P 0jqi
!
dµ
where determinant is
¯¯¯¯
¯ 2P 0i µP 0iµP 0j 2P 0j
¯¯¯¯
¯ = (4¡ µ2)P 0iP 0j > 0. Then, we obtain the comparative static
results as in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6
The total di®erentiation of (15) yields0@ ¡4±i(2¡µ2)4¡µ2 ¡ µ3±jP 0i(4¡µ2)P 0j
¡ µ
3±iP
0
j
(4¡µ2)P 0i ¡
4±j(2¡µ2)
4¡µ2
1AÃ dti
dtj
!
=
0@ 4ti(2¡µ2)4¡µ2 ¡ 2D0i
µ3tjP
0
i
(4¡µ2)P 0j + °D
0
i
1A d±i +Ã ±jD0i
±iD
0
j
!
d°
+
Ã
¡ µ(qi(8¡µ2)¡2µqj)P 0i
4¡µ2 + °±jD
0
i
¡ µ(qj(8¡µ
2)¡2µqi)P 0j
4¡µ2 + °±iD
0
j
!
dµ
where the determinant, by evaluating it in a symmetric equilibrium, is¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ¡4±i(2¡µ
2)
4¡µ2 ¡
µ3±jP
0
i
(4¡µ2)P 0j
¡ µ
3±iP
0
j
(4¡µ2)P 0i ¡
4±j(2¡µ2)
4¡µ2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = ±2©4¡ µ2 > 0:
Lemma 6 is obtained by the comparative statics of the above.
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Figure 1: Product di®erentiation and outputs
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